When faced with threats of violence, it is of great importance to assess the risk for actual harm to occur.
an overview of differences and similarities in threat and risk assessment, see Meloy and colleagues (2014a) . Most relevant to the present study is the fact that both fields make use of a Structured Professional Judgment model (SPJ; Guy, Packer, & Warnken, 2012) . SPJ relies on the discretion of the professional, while providing structure to their judgment via empirically informed guidelines (Douglas, Ogloff, & Hart, 2003) . SPJ is therefore considered a middle ground between two decision-making models that characterize risk assessment practices: the unstructured clinical model that relies on the subjective assessment of the expert and the highly structured actuarial model that relies on data based algorithms (Meehl, 1954) . Risk assessment instruments that are developed under an SPJ approach hold a list of empirically supported risk and protective factors, these factors are operationalized, and guidelines are provided on how to score them. However, the scores do not add up to a fixed outcome, they are meant to guide the professional in their clinical judgement of risk (Douglas et al., 2003) . The responsibility of professionals applying SPJ is to recognize potential risk or protective factors in an individual case, and to assess the degree to which the (combination of) factors increase or decrease the overall risk for violence (Douglas et al., 2003; Skeem & Monahan, 2011) . In other words, threat assessment professionals are supposed to both select and weight information cues to indicate the risk for violence posed by the individual of concern. But how good are they in doing so?
The quality of expert performance can be defined by the ability to perform consistently with oneself and with others (i.e., reliability), and by the ability to base decisions on relevant information (i.e., biasability; Dror, 2016) . Differently put, experts are presumed to identify, cluster, and weight information in the same way, and they should make their judgments relatively free of biases (Einhorn, 1974) . As it remains challenging to certify expertise (Ericsson, 2008; Shanteau, Weiss, Thomas, & Pounds, 2002) , the focus of this paper is on the more objective measure of professional experience. Specifically, we examined how professional experience affects the assessment of threats of violence.
Research suggests that superior professional performance results mainly from domain-specific knowledge (Patel & Groen, 1986; Schmidt & Rikers, 2007) . Such knowledge allows professionals to quickly recognize relevant patterns and to generate scenarios, which contributes to an efficient information search (Elstein & Schwarz, 2002) . Expert physicians, for instance, were found to be significantly faster than novices producing diagnostic hypotheses (Joseph & Patel, 1990) . More recently, in a study with British police officers, experienced detectives generated more investigative hypotheses and actions when presented with a missing-person case, compared to their less experienced colleagues (Fahsing & Ask, 2016) .
The literature on risk perception further suggests that experts have a more realistic sense of the likelihood for danger to occur, whereas the general public tends to overestimate infrequent but catastrophic events (e.g., a terrorist attack; Weber, 2001) . However, this difference in knowledge between experts and laymen does not necessarily influence how they weight risk cues when faced with them.
Simply illustrated, an expert might assess the overall risk for a terror attack to occur as being low, but when confronted with concrete signs of an attack (e.g., someone enters the airport wearing a bomb vest) both experts and novices will judge this information as similarly dangerous. It has been theorized that risk assessment is largely affective in nature-even when approached rationally-and that affective risk assessment is equally well (or poorly) developed in experts and novices, as responding to threats is deeply rooted in human evolution (Slovic & Weber, 2002; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004) .
Studies that examined people's capability to detect suspicious behaviour showed that professionals were no better than novices in detecting deceit (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016; DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986) , or in deciding which travellers should undergo customs inspection (Kraut & Poe, 1980) . Thus, research and theory suggest that professionals may know better what information to look for, but once provided with the correct information cues, inexperienced and experienced individuals may asses this information similarly.
Based on this notion, we had no reason to expect that professional experience would affect the ability to distinguishing risk factors from neutral factors, or from protective factors. However, it was presumed that professional experience would affect the level of interrater-agreement, meaning that professionals who examined the same information would reach the same conclusion. Thus, we predicted that professionals would agree with one another on their risk assessments to a higher extent than non-professionals would (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, professionals were expected to know what information to look for. Therefore, we predicted that the professionals' (vs. non-professionals') search for information would be comparatively more in line with empirically supported threat cues (Hypothesis 2).
Method

Participants and Design
A total of 141 participants completed the survey. The sample consisted 45 professionals (30 men, 15 women, Mage = 44.87 years, SD = 10.13 years), 46 university students (12 men, 34 women, Mage = 27.42 years, SD = 9.97 years), and 50 laypersons (19 men, 31 women, Mage = 42.48 years, SD = 13.01 years). The sample size was guided by the number of professionals that could be recruited, meaning that the number of students and laypersons was matched with the number of professionals that participated.
The reason for including two non-professional samples (students and laypersons) was that students may not fully represent the non-professional population, as they are studying to become professionals Professionals were approached via associations of threat assessment professionals in Europe (Association of European Threat Assessment Professionals, AETAP) and in Canada (Canadian Association of Threat Assessment Professionals, CATAP) to take part in a survey on threat assessment.
They were either members of these associations, attended a conference on threat assessment in April 2016 that was organized by AETAP, or they were recommended as eligible participants by those who were initially approached. The countries in which the professionals operated were Canada (n = 9), The Netherlands (n = 8), Germany (n = 7), the United States (n = 3), Australia (n = 3), worldwide (n = 3), Austria, Belgium, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, New Zealand, South-Africa, Sweden, and Switzerland (all n ≤ 2). Professionals were not financially rewarded for their participation.
Students and laypersons were recruited for a study on how people make risk judgments. Students were approached via the participant pool of a Swedish university where they had signed up for participation in psychological research. They were compensated 50 SEK (approx. 6 dollar). Laypersons were approached online through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and were paid 0.30 USD upon completion. Participants in the laypersons sample were from the United Stated (n = 41) and India (n = 9).
All participants completed the same survey. The data collection took place from April to June 2016.
Materials
Three fictitious cases were constructed in which a person posed a potential threat of violence towards one or several other persons. To prevent the outcomes from being the result of one particular case or one particular domain of violence, each case reflected a different domain of violence that is commonly encountered in the field of threat assessment. These domains were intimate partner violence (case "Terry"), public figure violence (case "Marc"), and workplace violence (case "Frank"). The cases consisted of 15 to 21 information cues describing i) the context in which the threat evolved and ii) the behaviours and characteristics of the person posing the threat. Each information cue in the cases was selected based on risk factors and protective factors that have been found to be empirically valid. For instance, the information cue Frank's position within the firm is uncertain reflected the risk factor "employment instability" (Feldman & Johnson, 1996) . Protective factors are conditions and behaviours that may reduce the risk of violence, which can also be the absence of risk factors (Borum, 2000) . For instance, the information cue Frank joins a running group twice a week indicated the absence of the risk factor "social isolation" (Meloy, White, & Hart, 2013) . In addition to the risk and protective factors, each case held two pieces of neutral information. That is, information that is not empirically known to increase or decrease the risk for violence as such (e.g., having tattoos). Two experienced threat assessment professionals provided feedback on the cases. They recognized the cases as cases they would encounter in their profession, and hence, perceived the storylines as relevant and realistic. The cases are presented in the Appendix.
Procedure
The first page of the survey stated that the study included three descriptions of separate cases in which a person poses a potential threat. The participants were instructed to read each case and to answer the accompanying questions. Participants were informed that participating was confidential, voluntary, and for research purposes only. After agreeing on these terms, they were presented with the first case, followed by three questions. First, participants were asked to assess the overall risk for physical violence currently posed by the main character (0% = no risk for violence, 100% = guaranteed risk for violence; any number between 0 and 100 could be selected). Next, they were presented with a list of specific information cues derived from the case. They were asked to assess the extent to which each information cue increased or decreased the risk for violence in this particular case (e.g., Frank's position within the firm is uncertain; -4 = very strong decrease, 0 = neutral, 4 = very strong increase). Finally, participants were asked to list up to five additional information cues that they would request in order to make a more adequate assessment of the risk for violence for this particular case. The same procedure was repeated for each case. The cases were presented in a randomized order.
After completing the case-related questions, participants provided their age, gender, and number of years working in the field of threat assessment. In addition, professionals were asked to indicate in which country they worked and how they were professionally involved in threat assessment (e.g., screening and security, criminal intelligence gathering). Students and laypersons were asked to indicate their country of residence and their employment status (e.g., student, employed for wages). Participants needed approximately 30 minutes to complete the survey.
Data Analyses
Coding. Two research assistants coded the information cues requested by the participants. First, the total number of requested information cues was counted per participant per case (ranging from 1 to 5).
Second, each information request was classified as 'key request' or 'other request'. A request was considered a 'key request' when it matched one of the 11 key questions identified by Vossekuil, Fein, and Berglund (2015) . These key questions are supposed to cover all areas that should be inquired in order to make a fully informed assessment about a person posing a threat. Information requests that did not fit any of the key questions were categorized as 'other request'. The 'other requests' were then further qualified into specific areas of inquiry. All areas of inquiry specifying 'key requests' and 'other requests' are listed in Table 1 . Two coders categorized a random 30% of the material into 'key requests' vs. 'other requests' (85.71%, Cohen's κ = .71) and further specified the requests into one of 17 specific areas of inquiry (74.44%, Cohen's κ = .66). One coder completed codings on the remaining material.
Recoded values.
Participants assessed the information in the cases on a 9-point scale with values ranging from -4 to +4. These values were chosen to enhance the participants' visual representations of risk decrease (minus) and risk increase (plus). However, the scale was recoded into values ranging from 1 to 9
for data analyses.
Results
Initial Analysis of Risk Assessments
To reiterate, the assignment of a risk value (1 = very strong decrease, 9 = very strong increase) to one information cue was considered one assessment. The three cases together contained 57 information cues. Hence, each participant made 57 assessments of specific information cues. One-sample t-tests revealed that professionals assessed information cues that reflected risk factors as risk increasing (i.e., the average rating was significantly higher than the neutral value "5"; Mprofessional = 6.44, SD = 0.56, t(43) = 17.14, p < .001, d = 5.17), and information cues that reflected protective factors as risk decreasing (i.e., the average rating was significantly lower than the neutral value "5"; Mprofessional = 3.90, SD = 0.74, t(43) = 9.93, p < .001, d = 2.99). Information cues that reflected neither risk factors nor protective factors were rated as neutral (i.e., the average rating was statistically similar to the neutral value "5"; Mprofessional = 4.97, The mean values for each information cue are displayed in Figure 1 . As shown in the figure, the professionals' assessments were highly similar to the assessments of the non-professionals. Only two out of 57 information cues were assessed in one direction by professionals (risk decrease) and in the other direction by non-professionals (neutral / risk increase). Although this could have been the result of chance, the two items (Rebecca has avoided all contact with Terry; Rebecca has received a new telephone number and moved to another neighbourhood) reflected a similar theme, which was, contact between victim and threatener in partner violence. Furthermore, participants in all three samples assigned the highest risk values to information cues that reflected a communicated threat.
Besides assessing specific information cues, participants were asked to judge the overall risk for Post hoc test further revealed that the difference between the student sample and the layperson sample was significant too (p < .001). The main effect of case was not statically significant, F(2, 162) = 0.52, p = .598, ƞp² = .006, neither was the Sample x Case interaction effect, F(4, 162) = 1.51, p = .200, ƞp² = .036. Thus, the results indicate that the consensus among the professionals was systematically (i.e., regardless of the case) higher than the consensus among the non-professionals. This supports Hypothesis 1.
The above analysis does not account for where on the 9-point scale the spread was located. Spread on the lower (1-3), central (4-6), or higher part (7-9) of the scale was weighted equally. However, when examining agreement using this scale, the spread on the central part may be particularly relevant because it contains both a risk decreasing value (4) and a risk increasing value (6) . More specific, agreement on the direction of risk (i.e., increase or decrease) can be considered more critical than agreement on the magnitude of risk (e.g., strong increase or very strong increase). To test for differences between samples in agreement on direction, a chi-square test was performed on the number of confidence intervals within each sample that included the central value of the scale ("5"). Confidence intervals containing the middle value imply that some participants in the sample rated the information as risk decreasing (values below 5), whereas others in the sample rated the same information as risk increasing (values above 5). The six neutral information cues were excluded from the analysis because these cues were expected to obtain ratings close to the value of 5. The analysis was conducted on the assessments of the remaining 51 information cues. A significant difference across samples was found with regard to the number of confidence intervals containing the value 5, χ 2 (2, N = 153) = 8.70, p = .013, φ = .24. Thus, in further support of Hypothesis 1, professionals rarely disagreed with each other on whether information should be assessed as risk increasing or risk decreasing (N = 3, 5.9%), whereas such disagreement among laypersons occurred in approximately one third of the assessments made (N = 14, 27.5%, p < .05). The frequency of disagreement among students (N = 8, 15.7%) was not found significantly different from the other two samples.
Information search. After assessing the risk for violence, participants were asked to list up to five additional information cues that they considered relevant for making a more adequate assessment.
The requested information cues were classified into 'key requests' and 'other requests', and further divided into different areas of inquiry (see the Method section). ANOVA's were conducted for each case on (a) the total number of information requests, (b) the number of 'key requests', (c) the number of 'other requests', and (d) the number of different areas that were inquired. The latter measure served as an indication for the variety of the requested information. Descriptive and inferential statistics are presented in Table 3 . Planned contrasts confirmed Hypothesis 2. Professionals requested significantly more key information than students (all cases p < .001) and laypersons did (all cases p < .001). Furthermore, requests that were made by professionals covered significantly more different areas of inquiry compared to request made by students (all cases p < .001) or laypersons (all cases p ≤ .001). Post-hoc tests showed no differences between students and laypersons on any of the measures. Thus, when given the opportunity to gather additional data, professionals requested comparatively more relevant information and from a comparatively wider variety of domains.
Discussion
The results demonstrate that threat assessment professionals agreed more with one another on their risk assessments compared to non-professionals. Furthermore, professionals requested comparatively more relevant information (i.e., information that was consistent with empirical threat cues) and they based their risk assessment on information that covered more domains. Both the relevance and the range of the information gathered relates to the quality of threat assessments (Fein & Vossekuil, 1998 ). On a more general level, empirically supported decision-making as well as inter-rater agreement reflect quality standards in expert performance (Dror, 2016; Einhorn, 1974) . Hence, the results suggest that domainspecific experience advances threat assessment practices. With that said, professionals' beliefs about what cues were (and were not) alarming were highly similar to non-professionals' beliefs, suggesting that the actual interpretation of information in threat cases may be rather intuitive.
The current findings fit well in the state of science on expert performance. Early theories proposed that expert knowledge is more critical for cue selection (i.e., what information should be looked for) than for cue weighting (i.e., how should the information be interpreted; Dawes, 1979; Einhorn, 1974) .
Advanced performers, ranging from chess grandmasters to cardiologists, and intelligence analysts, have been found to be particularly good at extracting a meaningful gist from larger sets of data (De Groot, 1978; Corbin, Reyna, Weldon, & Brainerd, 2015; Reyna & Lloyd, 2006) . In other words, their experience directs their attention to critical information. When interpreting this information, however, studies have
shown that professionals, just like laypersons, often rely on common sense (Masip, Herrero, Garrido, & Barba, 2011; Stolper et al., 2011) . Drawing more specifically on literature on risk perception, it has been theorized that people rely on two different systems when they assess risk in financial, health, and safety domains: an affective and cognitive system (Slovic et al., 2004 ). The cognitive system contains, among others, knowledge on probabilities of danger to occur and is better developed in experts than in novices (Weber, 2001) , whereas the affective system, containing emotional reactions to risk, is inherently present and equally developed in all humans. Although the two systems operate simultaneously, the affective response to risk is assumed to be dominant (Damasio, 2001; Slovic et al., 2004) . This theory might explain why common sense notions on risk can overrule expert knowledge when assessing threats of violence.
However, the role of affect in professional threat assessment yet needs to be investigated.
The consensus found among professionals is to some extent reassuring. It suggests that threat assessment professionals tend to reach similar conclusions when assessing the same case. This sheds a positive light on threat assessment practices, as research on other legal domains reveals that disagreement among professionals is not uncommon. For instance, forensic experts were found to produce inconsistent interpretations with regard to DNA evidence (Dror & Hampikian, 2011) , fingerprints (Ulery, Hicklin, Buscaglia, & Roberts, 2012) , and footwear (Majamaa & Ytti, 1996) . Although such inconsistencies are worrisome, it should be acknowledged that consistent interpretations are not necessarily accurate. Whether the professionals' judgments for the current study were accurate or not could not be established given the fictitious cases used. Yet, their judgments matched the risk and protective factors that are known from the literature, which speaks to the quality of their assessments.
Limitations and Future Research
The study is limited in ways that might be addressed in future research. First, there is no guarantee that the information cues in the cases are directly tied to one particular factor, whether risk, neutral, or protective. For instance, suffering from diabetes was included as a neutral factor since diabetes has never been proven to relate to the enactment of threats. However, a participant could have reasoned that suffering from a chronic disease is a stressful condition and should thus be assessed as information that is risk increasing. Such reasoning would be in line with research showing that personal stressors may indeed indicate a higher risk for violence (Meloy et al., 2013) . As the current study did not tap into the participants' reasoning behind their assessments, it remains unknown if (and if so, how) participants connected the information cues to possible risk factors.
Another potential concern is that the cues in the cases may have been self-evident, meaning that their interpretation was straightforward. For example, the cue Marc is highly frustrated that the Minister has not replied. It is quite clear that frustration is risk increasing rather than risk decreasing. If the information given was less ambiguous than the information threat assessors typically face in real life, this may form an alternative explanation for the similarities found between the professionals and nonprofessionals. With that said, measures were taken to mitigate the risk of biased materials. The cases were perceived as realistic by two experienced threat assessment professionals and the cases contained risk factors known from the literature on threat assessment. Future studies could address potential limitations in the materials by extensive pre-testing and/or by studying threats assessors in a naturalistic setting.
Naturalistic Decision-Making (NDM) research has provided valuable insights on how to improve professional performances (Klein, 2008) . The domain of threat assessment suits the NDM characteristics well, as threat assessors-just like criminal investigators-typically operate in an uncertain and dynamic environment in which the stakes are high and time is limited (Ask & Alison, 2010) .
A brief note is warranted on a possible bias in the professional sample. Professionals may have been more motivated than non-professionals as the study concerned their own field of expertise. This could explain the higher number of information requests on behalf of the professionals. Yet, motivation does not explain the higher number of relevant information requests made by the professionals. The latter may still be best explained by their professional experience.
The present study solely focussed on threat assessment but the responsibilities of threat assessment professionals typically also involve threat management (Meloy, Hart, & Hoffmann, 2014b) .
Threat management refers to violence prevention and concerns questions such as: What action should be taken to mitigate the threat? Who should be involved in such action? And, how should the case be monitored? Future research might profit from examining how professional experience affects threat management tasks. Few sentences on how current study could have added an interview with profs
Taken together, the current study did not mirror the full dynamics and complexity of threat assessment work. However, the controlled and systematic set-up of the study holds great value because it allows for normative conclusions (i.e., "Outcome A is more/better than outcome B") rather than mere descriptive outcomes. Such a semi-experimental approach is novel to the field of threat assessment and it may contribute to a stronger scientific base.
Contribution to the Field
The current findings indicate that threat assessment professionals may contribute most during the information gathering stage. Professionals may advance the information search by setting the right scope, filtering diagnostic cues from less relevant information, and recognizing what intelligence is still missing.
The field of threat assessment can benefit from such knowledge in three important ways. First, those who consult threat assessment professionals can make more deliberate decisions when allocating responsibilities and resources. Second, the professionals can better explain to their clients what may be expected of them. Third, and most important, having the right person on the right job improves the quality of threat assessments, which should ultimately result in a safer society. Table 1 Areas of Inquiry Used to Classify Requested Information (5), as his parents could not take care of him (6). Marc's clothing style is described by others as "gothic" (8) and he likes to listen to heavy metal bands such as Led Zeppelin (9) . Marc never had many friends (3) and prefers to spend time alone (4). Yet, people described him as a friendly and good hearted guy (7).
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